Tax Reform and Investment: How Big an Impact?
Steven 41. Fazzari HE U.S. Congress has recently passed historic legislation that revises the fundamental structure of U.S. income tax law. Promoters of this legislation hope that the new tax system will encourage more productive use of economic resources and faster economic growth. Economists disagree very little about the general objectives of tax refor-m. The new law, however, has drawn significant criticism, primarily because of its treatment of capital investment. The new law weakens or eliminates many tax initiatives originally designed to stimulate investment.
This article analyzes the effect of tax reform on investment and the U.S. capital stock. It discusses the channels through which changes in the corporate income tax rate, the investment tax credit and the rules for deducting depreciation expense from taxable income affect the cost of capital and a firm's investment decisions. Furtherrnor-e, this article assesses how the increase in corporate taxes affects investment. First, however, the next section presents some capital theory concepts that provide a framework for understanding tax effects on investment.
SOME BASIC CONCEPTS IN CAPITAL THEORY
A firm invests to maintain and expand its stock of productive capital. Most economic models of invest- 
I + Depreciation. j,Desrred CapitalJ
Over the long run, the amount of depreciation is determined primarily by the size ofthe capital stock in place. To explain investment, therefore, one must understand how firms choose their desired stock of capital. ' We begin by analyzing the investment decisions of a representative firm that maximizes its expected earnings over-time to increase the wealth of its shareholders. The firm faces constraints on its choices. Some of these constraints, like the firm's technology, are determined by past investment decisions and the longterm development of the economy; other constraints are market-determined, such as interest rates and the availability of funds to finance investment spending. The tax system imposes another constraint on the firm's behavior. To under-stand its role in investment decisions, we must first see how firms would make investment decisions in the absence of corporate taxation.
'Equation 1 explains gross investment. Some studies consider the change in desired capital alone, or net investment. The response of investment and the actual capital stock to changes in the desired capital stock will not be immediate; there may be long lags between investment decisions, orders, expenditures and delivery. Estimates of these lags are necessary to predict the timing of investment arising from a change in desired capital. These transitional issues are beyond the scope of this article. The analysis here focuses on the long-run changes in the capital stock caused by the new tax law. For further discussion of short-run adjustments, see Jorgenson's (1971) survey article.
Investment Decisions without Corporate Taxation
When considering capital expenditure, a firm will compare the revenue that the new investment will produce over its useful life with the costs of purchasing and using the new capital. Because capital goods are durable, they contribute to production over a number of years. It would be incorrect, therefore, to charge the full purchase price of a capital good against revenue in the year it is purchased. Rather, the cost of a capital asset over a year-is its opportunity cost; this is simply what the firm gives up by holding it for a year. In the absence of tax effects, the opportunity cost of an investment has two components: interest expense and depreciation. 2
Suppose a firm uses its own funds to finance an investment expenditure. The firm gives up the opportunity to earn interest on these funds. If the firm borrows from others to finance its investment, then it must pay interest to its creditor. Whether the firm uses its own funds or borrows from others, some measure of interest expense enters the cost of capital.
Actually, only the real interest rate affects the firm's cost of capital. Assume that capital goods prices rise at the same rate as the general price level. If the interest rate were equal to the inflation rate, the firm would not sacrifice any purchasing power by holding capital assets instead of financial assets. Only the portion of interest that exceeds what is necessary to offset expected inflation, real interest, represents a sacrifice for firms that hold capital rather than financial assets. Let i denote the nominal interest rate and iv' denote the expected inflation rate -Then the real expected interest i-ate can be closely approximated by iThese concepts lead to a natural characterization of the way firms determine their desired capital stock and their corresponding investment decisions. New investment increases a firm's output. Economists call this increment to output during a year' the marginal product of capital (MPK). The revenue gained from 'Rather than analyzing the cost of holding a capital asset year by year, we could compute the present value of the costs overthe life of the asset. This would be subtracted from the present value of the revenues generated by the asset to give the net present value. To maximize its shareholders wealth, the firm would invest in any project with a positive net present value. This procedure is more complicated than the year-by-year analysis presented in the text. It leads to equivalent results, however, assuming that the firm takes the rate of depreciation and the real rate of interest as constant over the life of the asset.
investing in another unit of capital, the value of the marginal product of capital, is P x MPK, where p represents the firm's output price. The opportunity cost of a unit of capital, is its price, PC, multiplied by the sum of the real interest rate and the depreciation rate -~e + d).The insert on the opposite page provides an example calculation of this cost.
If the value of the marginal product of capital, P X MPK, exceeds the opportunity cost ofinvestment, P,(i it-' + d), the firm can increase its profit by making the investment. On the other hand, if P>< MPK is less than P 0 (i -'ir' + dl, the investment is not profitable. To maximize its profits, the firm will invest up to the point at which the revenues and costs from additional capital are equal, or,
The firm's desired capital stock is reached when the last unit of capital purchased satisfies equation 2. This is a fundamental result in capital theory-It divides the determinants of a firm's desired capital stock into technical (MPK and dl and market factors (P, P,. i). Changes in these factors alter a firm's desired capital stock, and, as equation I shows, changes in the desired capital stock along with depreciation determine investment. 2 TAX REFORM AND THE COST OF CAPITAL Of course, equation 2 is strictly valid only in the absence of corporate taxation. But the analysis underlying it helps to explain how the new tax lawwill affect capital spending. The changes necessary to incorporate corporate taxation into equation 2 are summarized in the insert on page 18. The key issue considered here is how tax reform has changed the after-tax cost of capital. We shall analyze three changes of particular importance: the repeal of the investment tax credit, the change in depreciation rules and the cut in the corporate tax rate.
Repeal of Investment Tax Credits
In 1963, the Economic Report ofthe President stated that ". --it is essential to our employment and growth 2 ln general, the marginal product of capital in equation 2 will depend on the input of other factors of production along with the capital input. These other factors, labor in particular, are not considered bjectives as well as to our international competitive stance that we stimulate more rapid expansion and modernization of America's productive facilities."Õ ne policy designed to achieve this goal was the investment tax credit, first instituted in 1962. This tax subsidy allowed firms to reduce their taxes by a percentage of their spending on certain kinds of capital equipment.
To integrate this into the capital theory summarized by equation 2, suppose that the revenues from capital investment are taxed at a rate t and the only allowable deduction for capital costs is the investment tax credit at a rate of k. Then, the after-tax cost of purchasing a unit of capital is the price paid (P,) minus the investment tax credit amount (I<PC). The after-tax benefit of investment is (1 -U multiplied by the value of the marginal product of capital. This changes equation 2 to
The investment tax credit reduces the after-tax cost of capital on the right-hand side ofequation 3, increasing the desired capital stock and investment. The new tax bill, by eliminating this subsidy, directly increases a firm's cost of capital, reduces the corporate sector's desired capital stock and depresses investment.
4 See pages xvi-xvii of the report.
Depreciation Rules: Some Theory
As capital wears out over time, its value declines, imposing a cost on the firm that should be deducted from its taxable income. A problem arises, however, when this concept is put into practice: how should depreciation costs be determined for tax purposes? From an economic perspective, depreciation is the change in the market value of a capital asset. But market value would be costly for firms to measure and the IRS to verity. As an alternative, the tax code prorides schedules prescribing the percentage of an asset's purchase price that can be deducted from each year's taxable income. Changes in these rules lead to changes in the after-tax cost of capital faced by firms.
While all depreciation schedules allow deductions that eventually equal the total historical cost of an asset, the earlier these deductions occur, the more valuable they are. Thus, the after-tax cost of capital is reduced by depreciation schedules that concentrate deductions over a shorter' period. Also, "accelerated" depreciation, which permits firms to write offa greater proportion of the asset's cost early in its life, reduces the cost of capital relative to "straight line" methods that divide the deductions evenly over the asset's service life.' To evaluate the importance of changing 'See Ott (1984) for a discussion of depreciation methods and an analysis of the effects of changes in the depreciation rules that occurred in 1981 and 1982. Finally, by reducing the corporate tax rate, the new tax law increases the after-tax discount rate firms use to calculate the piesent value of their-depreciation deductions at a given nominal interest rate. By itselt this reduces the present value of a particular-sequence of depreciation deductions.
As table I shows, on net these changes cause the present value of depreciation allowances to decline under-the new tax law. 'I'he effects for equipment are modest on average.
The new law has a much more significant impact on business structures. The ACRS system adopted in 1981 allowed firms to depreciate business structures over 19 years with an accelerated method (175 percent declining balance). The new law requires straight line depreciation over 31.5 years. As the bottom row of table I shows, this significantly reduces the pr-esent value of depreciation allowances for structures.
Changes in the Corporate Tax Rate
The new tax law cuts the top corpot-ate income tax rate from 46 percent to 34 percent. By itself, it might seem that this would stimtrlate investment, because it allows flims to keep a larger proportion of the profits earned from new capital. 'I'he analysis that led to equations 2 thiough 4 shows that this may not be the case. Although a cut in the corporate income tax rate increases the after-tax revenues gained from new investment, it also decreases the value oftax deductions generated by capital costs. Thus, the net effect on investment of a lower corporate tax rate is ambiguous. It depends on the extent to which capital costs are taxdeductible.
Let us consider this point in more detail. The cost of capital per dollar of investment is reduced by the corporate tax rate times the present value of depreciation allowances (tz). The lower the corporate tax rate, the lower the value of this deduction, and the higherthe after-tax cost of capital. Thus, considering this channel alone, lowering the corporate tax rate actually reduces the incentive to investAnother-primary component of capital cost is real interest earnings foregone by investing in fixed capital. In the absence of corporate taxation, this cost was essentially the same whether-firms linanced their investment with internal funds or external borrowing. This is no longet true when we introduce the corporate income tax. Nominal interest paid on debt is taxdeductible, but foregone interest on internal funds is not. This gives debt financing a tax advantage over internal financing.' The tax saving from inter-est deductions is the corpor'ate tax rate It), multiplied by the propoition of the investment financed with debt (LI, multiplied by the nominal interest rate (ii. This amount is subtracted fr-om the real interest rate in the 'See Brealey and Myers (1984) for a clear summary of this idea. capital cost in equation 4, which nowbecomes: In summary, reducing the corporate tax rate increases the bencfits from new capital investment by
raising the left smde of equation 5. At the same time, lower corporate tax rates rcduce the value of tax deAs noted previously, the corporate mncome tax rate ductrons for depreciation and mnterest £xpense. This also affects the revenue side of the investment dcciincreases the costs of new capital on the right side of sion 1 he effective value of the marginal product is equation 5 Therefore, this theory cannot predict II -tI P x MPK. A lower corporate tax rate stimulates whether the lower corporate tax rate will stimulate or rnvestmcnt through this channel; with lower taxes, depress investment. To obtamn a more definite result, firms keep a larger propor'tion of the revenues generwe must look at the net effects of changes in the tax ated by new mnvestment.
law. 
Net Effects of Tax Changes on the Cost of Capital
To fully assess the impact of tax reform on the cost of capital, we need away of combining all the changes into a single measure. The basis for this is the theory summarized in equation 5. By putting all the terms affected by the tax system on the right side of the equation, we obtain:
The right side of this equation is the tax-adjusted cost of capital per dollar of investment spending. Some representative calculations of this cost are shown in table 2.' The differences among the cost of capital estimates for diffement asset classes are primarily due to different rates of economic depreciation.
The first column of table 2 gives cost of capital estimates based on assumptions that reflect the old 'The basic reference for the tax-adjusted cost of capital measure is Hall and Jorgenson (1967) . Further details of the calculation are given in the appendix. To make the comparisons shown in table 2, one must make assumptions about the future course of nominal interest rates and expected inflation. The calculations in table 2 assume a nominal interest rate of 10 percent and expected inflation of 4 percent. These assumptions are the same for the old and new tax laws to focus on the results of tax changes alone. Some economists have argued that the tax reform will change interest rates and inflation. This issue is considered later in the article. Also, these calculationsdo not considerthe effects of changes in personal taxes on capital income. See Henderson (1986) for further discussion of this issue. On the other hand, the third column shows that the effect of changing the depreciation rules is more pronounced for the after-tax cost of business structures. The present value of depreciation deductions declines much more for structures than for' equipment under the new tax law. Compared with the base case of the old tax law, the change in tax depreciation rules raises the after-tax cost of capital by only 0.4 percentage points for equipment, on the average, while raising the cost of capital by 2.2 percentage points for' business structures.
The fourth column shows the effect of lowering the corporate tax rate from 46 percent to 34 percent. This causes a substantial reduction in the cost of capital for business structures, but leaves the equipment figures virtually unchanged. The analysis in the previous section explains this result. Theoretically, the net effect of 'In econometric analysis that uses National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) data, the investment tax credit for structures is often not set at zero. This is because the NIPA data for structures include asset classes, drilling rigs and air-conditioning equipment, for example, which were eligible for the credit. This is not important, however, for the illustrative calculations in table 2. a lower corporate tax rate on the cost of capital is ambiguous. The direction of change depends on the value of tax deductions for depreciation. The depreciation deductions for equipment per dollar of investment are much more valuable than those for business structures, because equipment write-offs are faster. Thus, lowering the corporate tax rate reduces the value of equipment depreciation allowances more than business structures allowances. On the other hand, the benefit of lower corporate taxes -from the reduced proportion of revenues paid in taxes -is the same for both equipment and structures. Thus, lower corporate tax rates benefit structures much more than equipment, as the fourth column of table 2 shows.
The aspects of the tax reform bill that affect the cost of capital have drawn significant criticism because some analysts view them as anti-growth. The results presented in table 2 provide some support for this view. The last column shows the net effect of the new tax law. All the cost of capital estimates rise relative to the old law. For equipment, the repeal of the investment tax credit has the most important effect, and some asset classes face higher costs due to changes in the depreciation rules.
For-business structures, the change in depreciation has a significant impact by itself, but this is offset to a large degree by the benefits of a lower corporate tax rate. The comparatively moderate increase in the cost of capital for-business structures is somewhat surprising in light of the strong criticism the new tax treatment of structures has drawn. This is probably because most analyses focus on the more obvious effect of less generous structure depreciation. But it is important not to ignore the important impact of lower corporate tax rates."
THE IMPACT OF TAX REFORM ON INVESTMENT AND THE CAPITAL STOCK
How large an effect will changes in the cost of capital have on U.S. investment and the capital stock? This is not an easy question to answer. Economists have not resolved important technical questions about the sensitivity of the desired capital stock to "Of course, this point is relevant only for profitable firms that invest in structures. Firms that invest only to obtain tax losses from fat depreciation allowances will be hurt by the new depreciation rules, but, since they pay no tax, will not be helped by lower tax rates. The higher the elasticity of substitution, the bigger the reduction in the long-mn capital stock.
Let c, and c, represent the cost of capital under the old and new tax laws, respectively. The theory predicts that the long-mn percentage change in the capital stock is given by:
where s is the elasticity of substitution. The assumptions used to derive equation 7 are discussed in the appendix. The higher s is, the greater the long-run reduction in the capital stock will be as a result of tax reform.
The elasticity of substitution is determined by the economy's technology. Although not directly observable, it can be estimated, and a wide range of estimates of s can be found in the economics literature. Some researchers have concluded that the elasticity of substitution is close to unity.' 1 Ifthis is true, the size of the desired capital stock would be very sensitive to changes in the cost of capital. Thus, even the modest increase in the cost of capital shown in table 2 could have a significant long-run impact on the capital stock.
"If the elasticity of substitution is equal to one, the economy's technology can be represented by a Cobb-Douglas production function. Jorgenson (1971) finds empirical support for this case. Also see Chirinko and Eisner (1982) for further discussion. These dramatic results support the views of tax reform critics. A 12.8 percent drop in the stock of U.S. capital equipment would cause a significant reduction in the economy's productive potential with a correspondingly negative impact on future national output and employment."
Other researchers have found that the desired capital stock is much less sensitive to changes in the cost of capital. For example, in an extensive survey of predictions from large econometric models, Chirinko and Eisner (1982) These results suggest that tax reform could have a more moderate effect on equipment and vit-tually no effect on structures.
Tax Reform, Interest Rates and Investment
The analysis up to this point has assumed that the interest r-ate would not be affected by tax reform. Yet, there ar-c widespread predictions that tax reform will "Some economists have argued that, although investment and the capital stock will fall as a result of tax reform, the projects that are undertaken will be more efficient. Eliminating special tax breaks for certain kinds of investment will encourage firms to carry out more productive projects rather than projects that generate the biggest tax savings. Thus, the fall in investment may benefit the economy by reducing wasteful investment. A complete analysis of this issue is outside the scope of this article. See Batten and Ott (1985) , Henderson (1986) , and the Economic Report of the President (1987), pp. 86-93, for further discussion.
decrease interest rates -The tax reform bill cuts marginal personal tax rates sharply, especially for' highincome individuals. Thus, the after-tax returns to saving rise, which stimulates saving and lower real interest rates. Furthermore, reduced capital spending lowers the demand for financing. This also pushes real interest rates lower. One recent study, for example, predicts that the new tax law will cause a 1.3 percentage-point decline in the corporate bond yield and a 0.5 percentage-point decline in the inflation rate. Under these circumstances, the real interest rate would decrease 0.8 percentage points."
The effects of lower interest rates are explored in table 3. The first column reproduces results given earlier for the percentage changes in the capital stock assuming no changes in real interest rates due to the new tax law. These figures show that even modest reductions in real interest rates from the new tax law can substantially mitigate the negative impact of tax reform on investment. The effects on the stock of producers' durable equipment are moderate, especially with the lower-elasticity of substitution estimate. Surprisingly, the calculations show that the desired stock of business structures may even rise with real interest rate reductions in the middle of the relevant r'ange. Thus, the dramatic reductions in the capital stock and investment predicted by some critics of the new tax law represent a worst case, where the elasticity of substitution is high and the real rate of interest does not fall in r-esponse to tax changes.
The Effects of Increasing Corporate Tax Burdens
The analysis to this point has used conventional capital theor'etic concepts to evaluate the impact of tax reform on investment incentives. Tax policy affects investment decisions by changing the costs and benefits of individual investment projects. A firm can obtain financing for any profitable project at the prevailing cost of capital. Thus, the reduction of a firm's inter-nal funds available to finance investment caused "These estimates are from Prakken (1986), p. 30. Some economists have argued that the fall in long-term interest rates during 1986 was due, at least in part, to expectations that the new tax law would reduce interest rates. Firms offset the decline in internal cash flow by borrowing the necessary funds in external capital markets.' 4 The economics literature, however, has identified reasons why this view may not be valid.
The assumption that all desired investment can be financed at the market interest rate ignores the problem of communicating information from borrower to lender. Jt is costly for lenders to evaluate the prospective returns of various investment projects because they do not have extensive knowledge of the particular situations facing potential borrowers. While borrowers will provide some relevant infonnation, they have an incentive to present an optimistic view of their circumstances. Thus, lenders may be willing to finance some investment projects only at interest rates so high that these projects become unprofitable. Furthermore, as various studies have shown, when capital market information is costly, some firms may not be able to obtain external financing even at high interest rates." In this case, the new tax law could "An immediate objection that might be raised against this view is that firms must pay interest on external funds, so borrowing appears more costly than internal finance. This is true on the firm's income statement. But in economic terms, the firm also gives up the opportunity to earn interest on internal funds when they are spent on capital accumulation. "This situation is called 'credit rationing" in the economics literature.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) present a theoretical model that explains this possibility. This idea is linked to investment theoretically by Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss (1984) and empirically by Fazzari and Athey (1987) .
reduce investment because firms would not be able to offset the loss of internal funds by borrowing.
Furthermore, even if lenders are willing to provide funds at favorable market interest rates, firms themselves may be reluctant to use credit markets to recover investment finance lost under the new tax law. Firms are concerned about their debt-equity ratios and their credit ratings. Thus, they may choose to curtail capital expenditures rather than increase borrowing. New equity issues are a potential source of funds, but the historical evidence shows that little new investment is financed through new share issue." How big an impact will tax reform have on investment through this channel? The investment equation I can be modified to address this question:
The parameter b represents the size of the effect of internal cash flow on investment. Estimation of b from "In a detailed study of 12 large companies over 10 years, Donaldson and Lorsch (1983) , p. 52, show that only 0.5 percent of new funds raised resulted from equity issues. They also find a strong preference for internal investment financing, rather than debt financing. Common and preferred stock issues accounted for only 3.9 percent of the sources of funds for 799 industrial firms reported on the Value Line database in 1984. Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984) provide a theoretical explanation, based on capital market signaling, for why firms avoid equity finance.
historical data shows that cash flow has been positively related to equipment investment over the last three decades; cash flow had no significant effect, however, on business structures investment. The details of the estimation are presented in the appendix.
These estimates provide one way to predict the effect of increasing corporate taxes while reducing personal taxes. Suppose, in the absence of tax changes, that real equipment investment would grow from mid-1986 through 1988 at aS percent annual rate. Now suppose that the new tax act will increase corporate taxes by $25.2 billion in 1987 and $23.9 billion in 1988." Then, the estimates of equation 8 predict a 2.8 percentage-point reduction in equipment investment for 1987 and a 2.1 percentage-point reduction in 1988, relative to the benchmarks percent real growth trend, While not especially tar-ge relative to historical variations in equipment investment, these changes are still substantial."
There is an important qualification to these predictions. The calculations are based on the assumption that firms absorb the whole tax increase in reduced cash flow rather than increasing before-tax markups to recover part of the tax increase through higher prices. This assumption becomes less realistic as the forecast horizon expands further into the future and firms revise their-pricing policies to reflect the new tax system. This eventually could reduce or even eliminate the effect of higher taxes on corporate cash flow.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
How big an impact wilt ta'r-eform have on investment? The analysis presented here shows a r'ather wide range of possibilities. Capital theory implies that the new tax law will increase the cost of capital, especially for producers' durable equipment investment, tending to reduce investment and lower the U.S. capital stock. The size of this effect, however, is uncertain. Under some assumptions, the rising cost of capital leads to a dr-amatic 13 percent tong-run fall in the "The 5 percent annual growth rate was the actual growth rate of real producers' durable equipment investment from the second quarter of 1985 through the second quarter of 1986. It gives a benchmark for equipment investment growth in the absence of tax reform. The estimated changes in corporate taxes were obtained from the congressional conference committee report on the Tax Reform Act of 1986. See Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. (1986) . "The standard deviation of the producers' real durable equipment growth rate from 1970 through 1985 was 9.9 percentage points. stock of equipment. Different assumptions, however, lead to much smaller changes. Moreover, lower interest rates caused by tax changes will likely offset some of the rise in after-tax capital costs due to changes in tax rules.
The 1987 Economic Report of the President predicts that 'a somewhat higher overall marginal tax rate on capital income will modestly reduce the economy's long-run capital intensity" (p. 791. The analysis presented in this article supports this view. A middle-ofthe-road forecast indicates that the new tax law alone will cause a moderate decline in equipment investment, chiefly due to the repeal of the investment tax credit. The effects on business structure investment will likely be small, at least for structure investment motivated by economic profits as opposed to tax benefits (see footnote 10). The rollback of generous depreciation treatment for structures increases their after-tax cost, but the lower corporate tax rate and the potential for lower real interest rates largely offset the depreciation rule change. 
